A NOTE ON
“It was also a misuse of the method of ostracism
which, in my view, is a
valuable political expedient only at such times when there are
two sharply contrasting policies in the
state, one of which, from necessity, has to be
adopted; and in such cases it is
obviously desirable that the man who
should be required to go into exile should be one or other of the
leaders of the two parties.”
Ostracism of
Damon, in Pericles the Athenian by Rex Warner,
In putting forward the yielding hypothesis of
depression (Price and Sloman,
1988) we did not compare the hypothesis directly with other
hypotheses of the adaptive function of
depression. One alternative hypothesis is that which sees depression as serving to
detach the individual from an
unattainable goal. This theory, put forward by Klinger (1975) and
by Hamburg et al. (1975), sees
depression as a second, "fall-back" strategy, to be adopted when goal pursuit is blocked
and an initial strategy of invigoration
and aggression (elevation of mood?) has failed. Hamburg et al. put it as follows:
"Let us briefly consider anger and depression
from this [phylogenetic]
perspective. The angry organism is making an appraisal of his current situation,
which indicates that his immediate or long-run survival needs are jeopardised; his basic interests are threatened. Moreover,
his appraisal
indicates that another organism (or group) is responsible for this threat. Although there are many ways he
can go from this appraisal,
the general tendency is to prepare for vigorous action to correct
the situation, quite likely action
directed against the person(s) seen as
causing or at least manifesting the jeopardy to his needs. The signals are likely to be
transmitted to these individuals as well as to the organism's own decision-making apparatus. The
significant others are then likely to respond in a way that will ameliorate
the situation. In a medium range of intensity, anger and some associated
aggressive actions are likely to bring
about a result desirable to the person and acceptable to his
significant others. At very high
intensity, the risk of serious injury becomes great for the initiator as well as for others.
This behavior can readily become maladaptive.
"Depressive responses have similar characteristics. However, they
tend to follow a prior angry period; but the angry responses have not
elicited a rewarding outcome. Then a
feeling of sadness and discouragement sets in. The subject estimates the
probability of effective action as low. By the term effective action we refer here to
action the subject believes to be in his
self-interest or group interest, even though his belief may be vaguely formulated. He may, in effect, have been
prepared for this orientation
through the long past experience of his species or his population
or his family or his own experience or
some combination of these. But, however he came to this appraisal, it is now a
firm commitment, somehow bound up with
his survival. How can the depressive responses be viewed as
adaptive? As we saw in the case of anger, they can
be adaptive in a medium range of
intensity. His feeling of sadness and discouragement may be a useful stimulus to
consider ways of changing his situation. If a key human relationship is in jeopardy, ways of
improving that relationship, or
substituting a better one, may be considered. Moreover, his state of sadness may elicit
heightened interest and sympathetic consideration on the part of significant other people. Their
actions as well as his own may work toward improvement of the
situation. But at very high intensity, the depressive responses increase survival
risks for the person: (a) in terms of his own behavior,
physiology, and susceptibility to disease; (b) in terms of the response of others, which tend
to become unfavorable or at least ineffective in the face of intense
depression (Klerman, 1971)." (pp 239-240)
Advantages of the
1. It fits well with other psychological theories.
Hamburg is saying that when the route to a goal (or
enjoyment of a goal) is blocked, the
individual reacts first with a phase of
invigoration/protest/aggression which may well succeed in removing the block;
if the phase of invigoration fails to remove the block, the individual enters a phase of depression in
which there is retrenchment,
consolidation, repair, restoration of expended energy, and in which
the individual not only has time to lick
his wounds but also is able to receive
the help of others to restore his health. In this phase of recuperation the
individual has time to reasses the goal which has
been blocked and hopefully choose
alternative goals that are realisable. This theory is compatible with the formulation of Dollard et al. (1939) in which aggression is seen as a response to
frustration, and with the view of Schmale (1973) in which depression is seen as a time for
restoring energy. It is closest to the theory of Klinger (1975) who sees the
pursuit of goals and
incentives as being an alternation of active pursuit and disengagement, depression being the state of disengagement.
It fits with Bowlby's (1973) formulation of the response to
separation in which a phase of protest is
followed by a phase of despair. It is not incompatible with Selye's biphasic
General Adaptation Syndrome, in which a phase of increased resistance is followed by a phase of
exhaustion (Selye, 1936).
2. It is compatible with evolutionary theory
If the tendency to depression were a single additive
character, then we
could say that a polymorphism is maintained in the population
by heterozygote
advantage. The individual with one gene for depression gets moderately depressed when goals are
severely blocked, and he is better
adapted to survival that the individual with two depressive genes who
gets depressed too easily, or too severely, or for too long; and he is also better adapted than the individual with no
genes for depression who wastes his substance
pursuing unattainable goals and of whom it might be said that he "does not know when to give up".
The same
argument applies if the tendency to depression is a multifactorial
genetic character, when the general biological principle would hold that individuals in the middle of
a distribution tend to be better adapted
than those on either extreme.
According to
this argument psychiatrists are not in a good position to speculate on the biological advantage
of depression, because our depressed patients
are those on the extreme of the distribution whose depression is maladaptive. Almost by definition, if you get
to a psychiatrist, your
depression has not done its job. Possibly the 95% of psychiatric
patients in the UK who are seen by
general practitioners and not referred to
psychiatrists have adaptive degrees of depression, or possibly only
that 50% of depressives who are
identified in community surveys and do not even
consult their family doctor.
3. It deals with the relation between aggression and
depression.
There is a large and confusing literature on the
relation between
aggression and depression, and even now there is controversy as
to whether the outward expression of aggression (hostility) is inhibited
in depression, as it is in the
psychoanalytic formulation of depression as
aggression turned inwards onto the self. However that may be, a psychological formulation of depression
should be clear about the relation to
aggression, and Hamburg's theory does this by postulating that depression occurs as a "second
string" response when the primary aggressive response to a blocked goal is ineffective.
Disadvantages of the
1. It does not explain important features of
depression, such as pervasiveness,
incapacity (for perception, execution and decision-making) and unsociability.
2. Episodes of depression are not usually preceded by
a phase of
invigoration, anger or protest. In the case of both mild and severe depressions,
most patients pass gradually from a period of normal functioning into the episode of depression.
Hamburg et al. themselves (p
250) describe the way this may occur in human grief, when
"some persons slide into a clinical
depression, in which there is a pervasive undermining of prior interests and human relationships,
with feelings of despondency."
3. The relinquishing of unattainable goals may occur
at a late stage in the
depression or not at all. What does happen early in the depression is that the pursuit
of the goal is blocked by the symptoms of the depression, such as anxiety or apathy. But these very
symptoms also block the choice and pursuit of alternative goals.
An alternative hypothesis:
depression is a means by which a group detaches itself from the goal of one member and
switches its allegiance to the goal of
another.
The pervasive incapacity mentioned above makes it
unlikely that depression
is an evolved mechanism for switching from one goal to another within
the individual. But if we raise our
frame of reference to the level of the social group, the situation is quite
different. Groups often have
incompatible goals espoused by different important members or
factions; for instance, one member may
advocate war with a neighbouring group while
another member advocates peace. Let us say the war advocate is in the ascendant and the
group carries out a war policy. Let us also assume that the war policy is failing. The member
who advocated the war policy loses prestige, feels guilty and in the
wrong about his failed policy and the
deaths of his fellows in unsuccessful battles, and becomes depressed. As
a result of his
depression he ceases to press his war policy with his usual vigour. Students of emotion (Scherer et al.,
1986) find that when things go wrong and
one attributes the cause to oneself, one becomes depressed, whereas when things go wrong and one
attributes the cause to someone else,
one becomes angry (with whoever is held responsible). Therefore the peace advocate, who
feels "in the right", is angry with the war advocate, and the expression of his anger (catathetic
signals) is likely to make the war
advocate even more depressed. The war advocate is now depressed for three separate but
related reasons: he has lost prestige
because his policy has been seen
publicly to fail; he feels guilty about
the failure of his own policy; and he is in receipt of catathesis
from the peace party. None of
these three conditions applies to the peace
advocate, who does not become depressed
and continues to espouse his cause with undiminished vigour. It is likely that, in these
circumstances, the group will change its goal from war to peace. Moreover, the depressive
reaction of the war advocate will help him to adjust to the change in
policy, and possibly to a change in
leadership, and will reduce the chances that he will change groups and
go and fight for the other side.
According to
this theory the cause of depression is failure to achieve a goal in the presence of another
group member who is espousing an alternative
and incompatible goal. The goals may be incompatible because only one person can occupy the goal,
such as a territory or leadership
position, or they may be incompatible for some technical reason, such as
it being difficult to wage war and peace
at the same time. In animals the only goals are usually social goals,
represented by territory or rank. There is not much else for a baboon to aim
for than to rise another step in the hierarchy - most potential
sub-goals and incentives are secondary to
the achievement of the primary goal of rank. Some species have non-social goals, such as
migration or the construction of nests and dens. But there is no adaptive advantage in becoming
depressed when one fails to achieve a
non-social goal. Let me give an example. The golden-headed jackal lives in a monogamous
situation, and builds a den to rear its young (Moehlman, 1986). Let us say that it has den-building apraxia, and however much it digs, no den results. There is no
non-social advantage in it becoming depressed and giving up because of its
failure to build a den; it would be better to make some alternative arrangement,
such as a nest of branches on the
surface. But there is an advantage in depression if the animal fails to build a
den in the presence of another golden-headed jackal who is looking for a territory. Then the
depressed jackal allows itself to be driven from the territory by the
newcomer, who is probably a nephew or
other close relative, hanging on for a season or two with its parents waiting for a territory to become vacant. The
depressed jackal thus gives
up the very slim chance of its own reproduction for the much
higher chance of collateral
reproduction, and its inclusive fitness is enhanced. In this example the depression comes into the
category of altruistic behaviour;
in other cases there may be
direct advantage to the depressed individual (as might have been the case with the war
advocate).
Summary
The pervasive incapacity of depression is difficult to
reconcile with a goal
reformulation model limited to the individual actor. However, these difficulties
disappear if we think of depression in relation to group goals. Those symptoms such as indecisiveness
and apathy which interfere
with the individual's formulation of new goals for himself,
interfere much less with his joining in
the pursuit of someone else's goal. Therefore depression may serve the function of
the transfer of the role of goal- setter from the depressed individual to
another member of the group. The proximate cause of the depression is
not likely to be seen in terms of
interpersonal competition by the actors concerned, but rather in terms
of failure to achieve the original goal.
However, the significant change achieved by the depression is the yielding
of the goal-setting role by one group
member to another, and therefore, since goal-setting is a leadership function, the depression has facilitated a
fall in rank.
References
Bowlby, J (1973) Attachment and Loss. Vol. 2: Separation, Anxiety and Anger.
Dollard, J. et al. (1939)
Frustration and Aggression. Newhaven:
Klerman, G.L., 1974, Depression and adaptation. In The
Psychology of
Depression. R.J.Friedman and M.M.Katz (Eds.).
Klinger, E. Consequences of commitment to and
disengagement from
incentives. Psychological Review 82:1-25, 1975.
Moehlman, P.D. (1986) Ecology of cooperation in canids. In: Rubenstein, D.I. & Wrangham, R.W. (eds) Ecological Aspects of Social Evolution.
Price, J.S. & Sloman, L. (1987) Depression as
yielding behavior:
an animal model
based on Schjelderup-Ebbe's pecking order. Ethology
and Sociobiology,
8, 85S-98S.
Scherer, K.R., Wallbott,
H.G., Summerfield, A.B. (1986) Experiencing Emotion: A Cross-Cultural Study.
Schmale, A.H. (1973)
Adaptive role of depression in health and disease. In Stress and Disease (ed H.G.Wolff)
Selye, H. (1936) A syndrome produced by diverse
nocuous agents. Nature,
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