SOCIAL
COMPARISON, SOCIAL ATTRACTIVENESS AND EVOLUTION:
HOW MIGHT THEY BE
RELATED?
by
Paul Gilbert,
John Price and Steven Allan.
Address for
Correspondence
Professor Paul
Gilbert FBPsS
Department of
Clinical Psychology
Summary
Social comparison
occurs in many forms of interaction. Despite a voluminous literature, the link
between human and non-human forms of social comparison has rarely been made or
explored. In this paper we consider the evolution of the competency to socially
compare self with others and point to its long phylogenetic history. Special
regard is given to intrasexual selection, competition for parental investment,
and reciprocal exchange. The evolved competency to social compare has been
important in two separate and mutually incompatible forms of social
competition, based on displays of either intimidation or attractiveness. This
has resulted in two self-concepts which have been called resource-holding
potential (RHP) and social attention-holding power (SAHP). These primitive
self-concepts derived from social competition may have been stages on the
phylogenetic pathway to human self-esteem. It is suggested that an evolutionary
approach adds a new dimension to current theories of social comparison.
SOCIAL
COMPARISON, SOCIAL ATTRACTIVENESS AND EVOLUTION:
HOW MIGHT THEY BE
RELATED?
Social comparison
has a long history in the literature. It is forty years since Festinger's
(1954) landmark paper highlighting social comparison as a key variable in
social relating. Wheeler (1991) has reviewed this history and the waxing and
waning of interest in social comparison. Over the years research has shown that
social comparison is ubiquitous in social relating, both between individuals
(Wood, 1989) and groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994;
Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1994), and that the reasons people socially compare
themselves are many and various (Suls and Wills, 1991). Social comparison can
be concerned with estimates of relative social rank (inferior-superior,
weaker-stronger, upwards or downwards), and similarity-difference (Furnham and
Brewin, 1988; Gilbert, 1992; Pratto et al., 1994). Social comparison can be
used to self-enhance, self-improve and decide whether to challenge or submit in
conflict situations. We will not review that voluminous literature here (but
see Suls and Wills, 1991; Wood, 1989) nor explore directly the literature
linking social comparison with psychopathology (Furnham and Brewin, 1988;
Gilbert and Trower, 1990; Swallow and Kuiper, 1988) and stress (Buunk and
Hoorens, 1992). Rather we wish to explore a potential approach to social
comparison research and theory, derived from evolution theory. We suggest that
the ability to compare self with others is phylogenetically very old,
biologically powerful, and is recognisable in many species. This observation
has largely been ignored in the literature so far. That humans socially compare
in more complex ways than other animals is undisputed, but the power of social
comparison to inhibit or facilitate social behaviour, and its linkage to
psychopathology, may result from the circumstances of our evolution.
Sexual Selection
The theory
outlined here begins with an exploration of evolution theory to set the
context.
In most mammals,
reproductive success depends on social success in various roles, such as caring
for offspring and forming helpful alliances, but one key role is in
out-competing others who are pursing the same resources (Barash, 1977; Gilbert,
1989; Krebs and Davies, 1993; Trivers, 1985). In primates a salient meditator
of reproductive and social success is the social hierarchy. Those high in the
hierarchy have more breeding opportunities and often make the more attractive
allies, compared to those low in the hierarchy.
The Social
Hierarchy
The social roles
of the (relatively) successful and unsuccessful are represented in two rather
different but sometimes related ways. In
some species the two contrasting roles are "territory-owner" and
"non-territory-owner"; in other species who live in groups they are
"high-ranking" and "low-ranking." There is now considerable
evidence that high and low ranking animals show differences in many domains
including various behavioral differences such as explorative behaviour, posture
and timidity (Henry and Stephens, 1977; Harper, 1985; Kemper, 1990; Trivers,
1985). In humans, social comparison has been found to be clearly linked to
assertive and submissive behaviour (Gilbert and Allan, 1994). Although no
longer rigidly territorial, humans do make social comparisons on the basis of
territory and possessions (e.g., the size of one's house, car and bank balance,
etc.).
Physiological
differences between low and high ranking individuals include stress hormones
(e.g., cortisol) androgens (e.g., testosterone) and neurotransmitters (e.g.,
serotonin) (Henry and Stephens, 1977; Kemper, 1990; McGuire, 1988; Sapolsky,
1989, 1990a,b). However, as Kemper, (1990) Raleigh, McGuire, Brammer and
Yuwieler, (1984) and Hartmann (1992) note, physiological changes are often the
consequence of rank changes not the cause. Testosterone, for example, can rise
following success at non-aggressive competitive games like chess (Kemper,
1990). On the other hand, in established ranks, drug effects seem to be
mediated via rank. Harber, Barchas and Barchas (1981) found that in rhesus monkeys
given amphetamine, dominant animals increased their threat, chase and attack
behaviours, while subordinates increased their submissive behaviour (e.g., fear
grimace and turning away). These were independent effects from separate groups
and not the result of the dominant animals threatening more and subordinates
submitting more. Nevertheless, the finding that physiology tends to follow rank
changes rather than cause them suggests that there is some process preceding
social contests that determines whether or not an animal will challenge
another(s), or refrain from doing so.
Moreover, in humans, judgements of rank and dominance are made very
quickly (Kalma, 1991).
Ritual agonistic
behaviour
To be socially
successful, a key issue centres on an animal's ability to operate some kind of
internal cost-benefit analysis. Thus, for example, in competing with others it
is important that an animal does not continually compete and challenge those
who will always defeat it; this would be to risk injury and waste energy. On
the other hand, it is important to challenge those who can be beaten in order
not to miss out on opportunities which could be available. As we shall argue
shortly, social comparison may help in this cost-benefit analysis by making it
possible to "pitch" challenges towards the optimum level of
cost-benefit risk.
In the vast
majority of vertebrate species the social interactions which create social rank
asymmetries take the form of ritual agonistic behaviour. This has been
vividly described and photographed by natural historians, comparative
ethologists and social biologists (Attenborough, 1992; Krebs and Davies, 1993;
Trivers, 1985). There are a variety of signals that are used to signal intent
to challenge, threaten, attack, submit and withdraw (Harper, 1985). In these
highly ritualised encounters, it is necessary for the process of losing to be
as ritualised as the fighting. In this context a ritual submission, arising
from a defeat or expectation of a defeat, operates a process of internal inhibition
which induces the loser to keep the rules, and to be no more of a threat to the
winner than if he had been killed or severely injured in mortal combat (Price
and Sloman, 1987; Price, Sloman, Gardner, Gilbert and Rhode, 1994). Moreover,
for a time at least, subsequent threat signals from the winner will
automatically trigger submission from the (earlier) loser.
It is as if there
is a kind of an internal referee which (en)forces the loser to behave like a
loser and refrain from fighting back or making claims on reproductive resources
that challenge the winner. In this way a status hierarchy emerges from the
preparedness of the winner to threaten and the loser to submit (Price, 1988).
Without this internalised substitute for an external referee, (i.e., without
this internal inhibition of challenging behaviour) the ritual or
"game" of agonistic behaviour would not be effective. Hence, winners
do not have to kill competitors, nor continually prevent losers from
challenging for resources on (say) a day to day basis, which would lead to
perpetual conflict and fighting. Rather, losers signal via their nonverbal
behaviour that they are in a no-challenge, inhibited state of mind. We suggest
that this internal referee is controlled by social comparison. Dominance,
however, is a complex concept, that defines relationships rather than
individuals, and social hierarchies are not necessarily linear (
When the relative
pay-offs of alternative strategies depend on the behaviour of other actors,
game theory provides an appropriate model. Using this approach, Maynard Smith
(1982) has compared what he calls a hawk strategy, characterised by an escalation of agonistic encounters, with
a dove strategy which is characterised by de-escalation (giving in). He has demonstrated in his evolutionary model
that, given certain conditions, a pure hawk strategy is not
"evolutionarily stable", in that it can be infiltrated by a mixed
hawk and dove strategy. In this model it is assumed that in encounters between
hawk and dove, the hawk has the higher pay-off, in terms of survival and
reproduction. However, when hawk meets hawk, the pay-off is lower because of
the risk of escalation to unritualised combat with consequent serious injury or
death. Submitting ensures the loser
survives. From our point of view this is another model which has shown the
evolutionary adaptiveness of having internal systems that allow the individual
to escalate or de-escalate according to evaluated chances of success or
failure.
The Role of
Social Comparison and RHP
What is the role
of social comparison in these interactions? Although animals may continually
test out the strengths of each other, (and this can be from a very early age as
in rough and tumble play; MacLean 1985), it also seems to be the case that
animals can work out comparative (self-other) differences sufficiently
competently to avoid gross mismatches of strength and ability. Thus, before
animals even get into damaging/losing situations one may signal to another that
they recognise they are weaker or not in a challenging state of mind and
therefore need not be attacked or challenged. Hence, some judgement of relative
probabilities of making a successful challenge has taken place. This depends on
social comparison which has a very long phylogeny.
Focusing on
agonistic behaviour, social comparison can be described in terms of a
self-concept which has been called resource-holding potential, or RHP (Parker,
1974; 1984). RHP is an intervening process which allows an estimate of fighting
capacity and the probability of making a successful challenge or successfully
defending against other challengers. On the input side it is defined by size,
strength, skill, previous success, weapons, allies and other factors that
increase fighting/winning capacity; on the output side it is defined by the
probability of attack (as opposed to escape or submission) when challenged.
There is a basic social evaluation process which is responsible for making the
comparison between "own RHP" and the RHP of a potential adversary and
follows the rule 'submit to those stronger, challenge those weaker' (Krebs and
Davies, 1993).
At its simplest,
the output from this system is either "favourable relative RHP" which
means that the individual evaluates him/herself to be more powerful than the
rival, or "unfavourable relative RHP" which means that the individual
evaluates him/herself to be less powerful than the rival (Price, 1988). The
"favourable relative RHP" output takes the form of threat, attack, or
other escalating forms of agonistic behaviour; the "unfavourable relative
RHP" output takes the form of flight, escape, submission, or other
de-escalating forms of agonistic behaviour. Usually, in an encounter between
two individuals, there is a clear difference in RHP, and the one who makes an
evaluation of "unfavourable relative RHP" backs off. If both make an
evaluation of "favourable relative RHP", there is a pair-wise contest
or fight, and the loser suffers a fall in RHP, so that next time they meet
there is a difference in RHP, and the loser will submit or back off.
In this way the
variance in the individual estimates of RHP in the population is increased, and
the frequency of fighting is reduced (i.e., some members will estimate they
have high RHP and can challenge for and defend resources, while others estimate
they have low(er) RHP and reduce or inhibit their challenging behaviour). All
the phenomena of ritual agonistic behaviour can be described in terms of
signals of either absolute or relative RHP.
Ritual agonistic behaviour can then be conceptualised as an RHP
management system, the objectives of which are to rank the population in terms
of RHP, and also to increase the variance of RHP in the population. In this way
the population is spread out along the dimension of successful/unsuccessful in
terms of reproductive success and access to resources that facilitate
reproductive success.
RHP and
Self-Esteem
Probably the
nearest we can get in human terms to the concept of RHP is self-esteem
(Wenegrat, 1984) and it is possible that self-esteem evolved out of the social
comparative components of RHP. Personal estimates of RHP (the ability to make
successful challenges for resources and defend resources from other
challengers-competitors) remain important components of self-esteem. Thus, in
humans, self-esteem may fall with loss of reproductively useful resources (loss
of mates to a competitor, loss of allies, failing to be chosen to gain a
position within society that goes with control over resources, or having one's
actions controlled by a more powerful other that limits personal exploration
and acquisition of resources). This would explain two aspects of self-esteem
which would otherwise be puzzling: its global nature (overall rating of the
self along one single dimension of "value") and the great variation
in self-esteem in the population; both these features are essential to the
function of RHP in regulating ritual agonistic behaviour. Clearly, this is
sharpest in situations where resources are in short supply or where there is
intense competition. Indeed, it does seem to be the case that the rates of
ritual agonistic behaviour are related to the shortage of resources and density
of predators (Power, 1991; Van Schaik, 1989).
If we now
substitute self-esteem for RHP, and also adopt the current ethological practice
of regarding behavioral variation as alternative strategies, we can formulate
our hypothesis in terms of RHP. Thus, social comparison is an ancient
ability that functions as a challenge and confidence regulator. Hence, a
self-enhancing social comparison is also a confidence boosting one.
Breeding and
Developmental Strategies
1) a
high-gain/high-risk strategy which means that an animal might do very well,
especially when in its prime, but could also do poorly if beaten or weaker than
others. We could call this the high challenge strategy or the ambitious
strategy.
2) a low-gain/low
risk strategy that offers moderate success but extends over the breeding life
time of the individual. There are a number of strategies that might be
associated with low-gain/low risk such as accepting a subordinate position and
waiting to take over a harem or waiting/working with allies for help, or being
sneaky and opportunistic. We might call this a low challenge strategy.
In other words it
is not necessarily the case that low self-esteem and a tendency to make
unfavourable social comparisons are maladaptive; rather they may reflect
alternative strategies for coping in an environment where others are seen as
more powerful and where the (non-conscious) preferred response is to adopt a
non-challenging position to the external world. This immediately raises the
question of how these strategies are chosen. Are they selected on the basis of
experience? Certainly, there is evidence that self-esteem and social
comparisons reflect rearing (parent-child) patterns and early peer group
experiences (Coopersmith, 1967, Dunn and McGuire, 1992; McCraine and Buss,
1984). Authoritarian parenting seems to increase susceptibility to disorders
involving low self-esteem such as anxiety and depression (Gerlsma, Emmelkamp,
and Arrindell, 1990). Also people seem to switch into a low self-esteem,
unfavourable social comparison strategy as they become depressed (Price et al.,
1994). Thus, a low self-esteem strategy may be activated early in life and more
or less dominate the internal sense of self, or it can be activated at certain
times when there are experiences of being defeated, powerless and failing to
meet challenges (Gilbert, 1992).
For whatever
reason, some individuals appear to opt for low self-esteem and non-challenge
strategies early in life and these show up in various forms, such as social
anxiety, fearfulness, inhibitedness, susceptibility to separation, and
proneness to dysphoria and depression (Swallow and Kuiper, 1988). Other
dispositions such as neuroticism and introversion may also reflect this
strategy. Recent research has shown a positive association of unfavourable
social comparison and introversion at r=.54 in a student population (Gilbert
and Allan, 1994). Others may select a high challenge strategy which shows up in
more ambitious behaviour, grandiose expression, needs to excel, control and
subdue others, with a special sensitivity to others as potential challengers
who can add to or subtract from self-esteem (hallmarks of narcissistic
disorder).
RHP and Social
Attractiveness (SAHP)
In many primates,
and especially humans, status and control over desirable social outcomes are
not solely obtained by agonistic behaviour. In humans, status is often
voluntarily bestowed in response to the display and demonstration of attractive
qualities of the self. Be it in courting, getting on the football team, finding
a job, and making friends, the key motivation is to be chosen/selected by
others. Thus, rather than intimidating others with demonstrations of RHP, humans
often attempt to demonstrate attractive and attracting attributes of
themselves, (e.g., their intelligence, exam passing abilities, physical
attractiveness, research skills, football skills). Indeed, at times
demonstrating too much aggressiveness (RHP) may be seen as an unattractive
quality, although being seen as weak and unassertive is also unattractive
(Baumeister, 1982). To distinguish the "attracting display" from the
threat display of RHP, Gilbert (1989, 1992) called it social attention
holding power (SAHP). This refers to the ability to direct favourable
attention to the self. Barkow (1980) and Kemper (1990) also suggest that
status/prestige via attractiveness is an alternative form of status acquisition
to that of aggression and threat. Hence, to be valued, chosen, admired,
accepted, desired, wanted, sought out, invited, and to experience one's company
as being rewarding to others all indicate that one has (high) status in the
eyes of others - one is esteemed.
By comparing self
with others one is able to estimate what others will find attractive in the
self (i.e., noting who is getting the attention and for what) and in comparison
with others, how one should change one's behaviour to obtain favourable
attention (e.g, work harder, pass exams, wear certain make-up and clothes,
etc.). Fashion, fitting in, various forms of competition to win approval and
positive attention, and showing off etc. can be influenced by such comparative
processes. Often, of course, one may want to fit in, yet also be a little
individual and better than others. Wolfe,
So the tactics of
choosing where to place one's efforts to gain status, and whom to compare with,
and thus how to maintain or increase status, rely on social comparative
information. Moreover, when a person evaluates that, compared to others, there
is insufficient, or a fall in RHP/SAHP in a valued domain, various common
defenses can be activated (Gilbert, 1992). Whereas high RHP can be maintained
via receiving submission signals, SAHP is usually maintained via receiving
positive signals (e.g., approval, admiration, wanted etc.). However, they can
overlap, and loss of either can activate various defensive responses such as
anxiety, anger, resentment. These two alternatives are represented in table 1.
Insert
table 1 about here
Thus, a writer
(seeking recognition and SAHP) who receives adverse criticism, or whose work is
ignored may become anxious, angry, envious, and/or dysphoric, just as losing a
fight might activate such responses. Receiving signals that one is not
attractive or has done something unattractive (and thus losing SAHP) can result
in shame and resentment (Broucek, 1991; Gilbert, 1992; Kaufman, 1989). Feeling
that one is vulnerable to being put down by more powerful others, or losing out
to them (and judgements of who is more powerful is of course a social
comparison) can activate social anxiety, frustrative anger and depression.
Since high and
low self-esteem people will vary in their degree of confidence, they may follow
different strategies for social comparison. Baumeister, Tice and Hutton (1989)
suggested that high self-esteem people tend to draw attention to their talents
and abilities, while low self-esteem people go for damage limitation,
self-protection and minimizing exposure of their weak points, i.e., they are
shame avoidant. Wood, Giordano-Beech,
There is also
evidence that when people do more poorly than they had expected they change
their social comparison strategies, becoming more self-protective (shame
avoidant), demoting the importance or relevance of the dimension/domain of
their poor performance and avoiding upward comparisons (Gibbons, Benbow, and
Gerrad, 1994).
Triangular and
Audience Comparisons
Not only do we
compare ourselves with others, but when seeking to make a choice (e.g., for a
lover, friend/ally or select our politicians) we make comparisons between
alternative individuals. And we are also aware that we, in turn, may be the
target of other people's comparisons. So unlike RHP, which tends to involve
pair-wise comparisons between two individuals, SAHP comparisons are more
complex. They will often involve triangular relationships or larger audiences.
In sexual relationships, a person maybe concerned that their lover is comparing
them unfavourably with another (potential or past lover/competitor). Thus, we
hear questions like "do you love me more than Fred?" In other words,
the person may not only compare themselves directly with Fred but also be
concerned about how the other (the lover) compares them with Fred. The fear
that this comparison is going badly (one is not a preferred person) can be the
source of envy and jealousy (Salovey, 1991).
In the domain of
sexual attractiveness there is evidence that males and females follow different
intersexual strategies and compare in different ways. Males are more concerned
with physical beauty while females are more concerned with power and status
(Buss, 1989). It also seems that females may be more influenced by the social
comparisons and evaluations made of males by female peers, especially negative
judgements (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, Shebilske, and Lundgren, 1993). In
general, self-presentation is likely to be influenced by the social comparisons
one thinks other people are making between self and others. For example, if
females believe that males are selecting partners on the basis of physical
beauty, then this domain is likely to be important, not only for
self-presentation (leading to an emphasis on make-up, style and body shape, for
example), but also self-evaluation.
Indeed, in many
domains of life we not only compare ourselves to others but we invite an
audience to compare us with one or more others, as in the beauty contest,
political election or even at the disco. In other cases we invite the audience
to compare us with some generalised standard of competence, as when a virtuoso
gives a musical performance. Taking exams and going for job interviews are also
examples of this. In attempting to be selected for, or fitting in with, a
group, (e.g., gaining employment) we not only compare ourselves to that group,
but we are also sensitive to the judgements that the group is making about SAHP
in the individuals it selects. Thus, selection (and thus success) is now
determined not by individual action (e.g., by being stronger than a competitor
or killing off the other lover) but by being able to entice the audience to
choose in one's favour. Nevertheless, failure to be selected can still activate
similar defensive responses to those that evolved to deal with losing pair-wise
contests (e.g., anxiety, anger, dysphoria, desire to hide or get away; see
table 1).
It is these
social comparative effects than can do so much damage in situations like
unemployment, because it is not the absolute levels of deprivation (which were
higher in war, and are higher in third world countries) that may cause the
vastly increased rates of various forms of psychological distress in low
socio-economic groups and the unemployed (Adler, Boyce, Chesney, Cohen,
Folkman, Kahn, and Syme, 1994). Interestingly, it does not seem to be so much
the absolute levels of poverty that are associated with health indices but the
distribution of inequality (i.e., degree of rank variation; Wilkinson, 1992).
Thus, it maybe the realisation that, compared to others, one is unwanted,
irrelevant, comparatively powerless, and with little of value to offer society,
which may do much to increase sensitivity to psychological stressors. One
patient said of his unemployment that he could not 'hold his head up now,' and
felt he had lost his status in society. Of course, there are many other aspects
to these issues as Adler et al. (1994) well note, but relative rank judgement
is not one they explore. Unfavourable social comparisons in the domains valued
by societal groups may lead some to opt out of the group and its values for judgements
(e.g., academic performance) and seek out alternatives (e.g., street gangs and
punk bands).
Parental
Investment and Social Comparison
Trivers (1974,
1985) suggested an evolutionary model of child-parent interaction based on the
notion that children (offspring) try to elicit high levels of parental
investment in terms of energy, time and resources from care-giver(s). The child
does this by various forms of care-eliciting behaviour. Indeed, the ability of
the child to elicit care rather than being totally passive and reliant on a
parent to dispense it, is (on the whole) advantageous to the child. However, as
Trivers notes, there will always be some conflict between how much investment
the child tries to elicit and the amount the parent wishes to give. The way the
child (and those who are interacting with him/her) learns to handle (social)
disappointment and frustration may be key factors in subsequent development.
Moreover, although not part of Trivers' theory, sibling social comparison of
how much care and attention they receive in relation to their sibling(s) can be
a salient factor in the development of self-esteem.
Siblings may
compete for the favourable attention and approval of the care-giver. This may
be with direct conflict (e.g., at meal-times arguing over who speaks first and
obtains the parental attention), or more indirect, such as each child doing a
painting and then asking mother which one she prefers (who has done the best).
In this situation the child is inviting social comparison by the parent and
making an estimate of the judgement the parent is making of each child.
The idea that
siblings are getting preferential treatment from a desired other can stir up
many unwanted emotions and reduce self-esteem, because it sends an unfavourable
message about one's relative SAHP. This is also the domain of favouritism.
The perceived differential treatment of siblings by parents can give rise to a
host of rivalries and sibling conflicts and various attributions. Typical here
are perceptions that a sibling is favoured due to: gender (e.g., my brother was
the favourite because my parents wanted/preferred a boy); age (I had it more
difficult because I was the oldest); physical attributes (my sister was more
attractive than me and got more attention); intelligence (e.g., my sister got
more attention than me because she was brighter); need (e.g., my brother got
more attention than me because he was a sickly/needy child) and personality
(e.g., my parents preferred my sister because she fitted in with the family and
its values better than me). As McConville (1985) found in free interviews with
sisters, these kinds of comparison are common. Moreover, parents may use social
comparison directly to shape a child's behaviour (why can't you be more like
your sister/brother?). Indeed, the use of social roles models, to whom one is
invited to compare oneself and copy can be used in many forms of social
relating (e.g., work, sport and religion). The role model can be seen as the
"favoured individual."
Reciprocal Altruism,
Giving and Receiving and Social Comparison
There are various
models of how helping and altruistic behaviours have evolved. One view put
forward by Trivers (1971,1985) works on a cost-benefit basis. It is
advantageous to help non-related kin, if in the future one can count on their
returning the favour via offering support/help. However, the cost should not
exceed the benefit (as in exchange theory). This implies that one central
domain of social comparison will be what self is giving to others compared to
what others are giving to self (Buunk and Hoorens, 1992). Recent evolutionary
models of psychotherapy see this as a key dilemma (Glantz and Pearce, 1989;
Slavin and Kriegman, 1992). Some patients see themselves as giving a lot to
others but receiving little back in return; others feel guilty about receiving
more than they give. In psychology, these concerns have been described as a
need to maintain equity in exchange (Burgess and Huston, 1979) and there is now
clear evidence that this depends on social comparison (Buunk and Hoorens,
1992).
The theory of
reciprocal altruism and exchange both suggest that humans monitor the exchange
of favours and compare themselves to others in terms of giving and receiving.
Caring giving and helping others who do not reciprocate can give the
experience that the giver is deficient, (need to try harder) or that the
receiver is cheating and one should stop helping. Upward and downward
comparisons also play a key role in help giving and the equalisation of
socio-economic disparities (Nagata and Crosby, 1991). When there is a
recognition of disparities between self (or one's group) and others, whether or
not these are translated into efforts to reduce the disparity, maintain it, or
even increase it, are due to many psychological and non-psychological factors.
These may include; the explanation for the disparity, ecological factors,
opportunities to be personally helpful, personal needs for the future (e.g., I
can't give things away now because I might need them later), degree of
relatedness and personal closeness, friend or foe, ingroup-outgroup and need
for dominance. Seeing oneself in a prosperous position compared to others might
enhance self-esteem but only add to a sense of superiority and the need to
guard what one has, rather than a desire to help others (Pratto, et al, 1994;
Sidanius et al., 1994).
Refraining from seeking
help or support can arise if this lowers self-esteem, due to unfavourable
social comparisons and shame - needing help is a weakness (Buunk and Hoorens,
1992; Fisher, Nadler, and Whitcher-Alagna, 1982). Indeed, even revealing that
one is in distress or needs help can be seen as inviting unfavourable social
comparison from others. This is why many health professionals avoid revealing
their own depressions and anxieties for they fear it will lead to a loss of
status (Rippere and Williams, 1986). Thus, the act of asking can be seen to
place the person in a lower status, one-down or dependent position. This may
explain why some people prefer help to be offered rather than asked for.
Friendship
Formation
Cooperation and
friendship formation have recently been explored using evolution theory by
Argyle (1991). Trivers (1985) suggests that friendship avoids the probability
of cheating (that is via comparing self with others one finds that one is
giving out but receiving less back). To some extent the values (e.g.,
religious, social class) of social comparison that bring about the formation of
alliances are socially prescribed. Nevertheless, social comparison plays a key
role in terms of judgements of similarity of values, plans, goals, personality,
gender and status. Both humans and primates (Crook, 1980) prefer to form
alliances with those similar in status rather than with those where there are
wide disparities of rank and status. In humans, age can also be a key variable.
Using the SAHP model it is likely that maintaining interactions with like
others will also offer clear guidelines for exchanging SAHP; that is, one can
be clear about what is, and will be, valued and have SAHP bestowed upon. We
suspect that maintaining a high (or optimal) rate of SAHP signals in
relationships is a salient factor motivating and maintaining people in their
social comparisons and preferences for like others.
Although Trivers
(1985) and Cook (1980) see the avoidance of cheating as central to friendship
formation, our approach suggests that maintenance (mutual support) of status
and rank may be a more primary concern than cheating. This leads to the as yet
untested hypothesis that in some situations, cheating and deception will cause
greater disruption when it has an effect on the future flow of SAHP; that is
when it is seen to be detrimental to status. For example, finding that someone
(e.g., a friend) has copied your work will cause more disruption (e.g., anger
and conflict) if that will effect your own status in the future rather than if
it has no such consequence.
Social Rank,
Kinship and Group Membership
Social
competition theory may help us understand the powerful psychobiological effects
of inferior-superior comparisons; especially when linked with the biological
variations associated with rank. However, it is important to recognise that
subordinate animals can also be marginalised and pushed to the periphery of the
group or even out of it (Trivers, 1985). This may be captured by comparisons
that are concerned with feeling different to others and an outsider. Indeed,
there is now evidence that both rank (upward-downward, inferior-superior) and
similarity of self to others (being like or unlike) are key dimensions of
social comparison and both are often used together (Buunk and Hoorens, 1992).
In groups, aggressive children are more accepted and have higher status if the
group is aggressive but not if it is relatively peaceful. Thus, similarity has
a powerful effects on status (Wright, Giammarion and Parad, 1986).
If one is failing
but everyone else is too then the effects of failure are lessened. Indeed, in
psychotherapy a key helpful experience is the recognition that one is not the
only one who is depressed or has been abused etc. A combination of feeling
different and superior is likely to have different effects to that of feeling
different and inferior. For example, depressed people not only feel inferior to
others but also different (Furnham and Brewin, 1988). The nature of shame also
implies both comparisons of inferiority and difference (Buunk and Hoorens,
1992, Gilbert, 1992; Kaufman, 1989).
Although we have
focused on rank/status, this alone may be insufficient to understand the
motivations and effects of both types of social comparison. For example, we
should perhaps not only recognise a need to avoid inferiority and shame but
also the importance of the evolved need for kinship, being like others, a
sense of belonging and group membership (Bailey, 1988; Bailey, Wood and
Nava, 1992). Indeed, the motivation to belong and be like others, can have
powerful effects on social behaviour, values (Argyle, 1991; Wolfe et al, 1986)
and self-identity/esteem (Abrams, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner 1990). Some of the
stress of making unfavourable social comparisons may well arise for the
potential loss of a sense of kinship and affiliation, associated with fear of
rejection, marginalisation, becoming an outsider and loss of support. Yet another
dimension may relate to closeness-distance (Birtchnell, 1993).
It also appears
to be the case that once groups form there can be group based motives to raise
the RHP and SAHP of one's own group in comparison to others groups. Pratto et
al., (1994) have called this social dominance orientation. The in-group can be
treated like kin. This one's personal RHP and SAHP may be linked to the
fortunes of the group to which one belongs.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we
have explored how an evolutionary approach can be helpful in understanding the
ubiquity of social comparison. We have suggested that many forms of social
comparison evolved as components of the mechanisms underlying intrasexual and
intersexual selection, parental investment, reciprocal altruism and the need
for membership of specific social groups. Thus, social comparisons can be pair
wise (one individual to another, as in a boxing match), triangular
(as in various competitions where the desired outcome is a preferential
relationship with a parent or other authority figure, electorate or lover) and group
(involving comparisons of self to the group in general; being like or dislike
`them,' and whether one's group/team is superior or inferior to other
groups/teams). Thus, the following forms of comparison seem to have
evolutionary roots in humans, if not also in other animals:
Stronger/weaker: This comparison of fighting capacity is probably the oldest form of
comparison. It relates to resource-holding potential (RHP) and underlies ritual
agonistic behaviour. This form of social competition subserves intrasexual
selection in most vertebrate species. In humans, it involves the ability to
make successful challenges and `stand one's ground'. In humans ritualised
contests of RHP are often expressed in groups (e.g., sports) and unritualised
contests in war. Weapons testing may be a form of ritualised RHP display, to
signal one's group's potential fighting ability.
More/less
attractive to the opposite sex: We know that
this comparison is made in our own species, but we do not know how widespread
it is in animals, or how much it contributes to intersexual selection.
More/less
favoured by parents: This comparison
of relative parental investment underlies sibling rivalry. It may also occur
outside the family in the comparison of investment from authority figures such
teachers, employers and other patrons.
More/less
attractive to the reference group: This assessment
of relative social attention-holding power (SAHP) is of two types, the
comparison of one's own display of attractiveness (talent, abilities, etc.)
with the displays of others and the comparison of the response of the group to
those displays (relative approbation).
Creditor/debtor: This ledger of favours given and received is an essential part of reciprocal
exchange. The comfort one feels in giving and receiving may depend on social
comparisons of superiority-inferiority, or weak-strong and fears of (and being
seen as) exploiting and being exploited.
In-group/out-group: This type of comparison is one of similarity-difference. Apart from its
obvious role in group cohesion and differentiation, it is important for the
evaluation of relative attractiveness, because it defines an in-group of
evaluators whose social attention is desired, and whose judgements of the
performer's display have the power to raise and lower SAHP. This comparison may
not only involve judgements of same-different and group membership (being like
or unlike, or belonging to), but also the relative superiority-inferiority of
the group one feels a member of, in comparison to other groups.
Mental mechanisms
have evolved to aid the motivation and competency for such comparisons and
subserve the outcomes of these various evaluations. Of particular interest are
those which subserve the outcome of `unfavourable social comparison', which can
be expressed as depression, anxiety, inferiority, anger, envy, shame and guilt
etc. By linking the concept of social comparison and self-esteem to ranking,
social competition, gaining and maintaining status, we are able to plot its
phylogenetic course and possible biological effects. It follows, therefore,
that social comparison may be one of evolutions most important psychological
mechanisms.
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Table
1 Types and Tactics of Ranking Behaviour
RANKING
SELF OTHER
Inferior-Superior
Controlled-Controller
RANKING SYSTEMS
(TACTICS)
POWER
AGGRESSION ATTRACTIVENESS
Cohesion Talent
Threat Role competence
Authoritarian Democratic-
authoritative
1 To
be obeyed To be valued
To
be reckoned with To be chosen
IF SELF IS
CONSTRUED AS LOSING/INFERIOR
(Possible
Defensive Responses)
Envy
Shame
Revenge
Defeated
Depression
Social Anxiety
Hostile
Resentment
Controlled by others
Involuntary
subordinate
Self-criticism
(internal attack)
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we
have explored how evolution can be helpful in understanding the ubiquity of
social comparison. We have developed the
hypothesis that many forms of social comparison evolved as components of the
mechanisms underlying intrasexual and intersexual selection, parental
investment, reciprocal altruism and the need for membership of a specific
social group. The following forms of comparison
have evolutionary roots in humans, if not also in other animals:
Stronger/weaker: this comparison of fighting
capacity, or resource-holding potential (RHP), underlies ritual agonistic
behaviour which is the form of social competition which subserves intrasexual
selection in most vertebrate species.
More/less
attractive to the opposite sex: we know that this comparison is made in our
own species, but we do not know how widespread it is in animals, or how much it
contributes to intersexual selection.
More/less
favoured by parents: this comparison of relative parental
investment underlies sibling rivalry. It
may also occur outside the family in the comparison of investment from
teachers, employers and other patrons.
More/less
attractive to the reference group: this assessment of relative social
attention-holding power (SAHP) is of two sorts, the comparison of own display
of attractiveness with the displays of others, and the comparison of the
response of the group to those displays (relative approbation).
Creditor/debtor: this ledger of favours given
and received is an essential part of reciprocal exchange.
In-group/out-group: this is a different type of
comparison, one of similarity/difference rather than relative success. Apart from its obvious role in group cohesion
and differentiation, it is important for the evaluation of relative
attractiveness, because it defines an in-group of evaluators whose social
attention is desired, and whose judgements of the performer's display have the
power to raise and lower SAHP.
These are all comparisons of self with one
or more others. We have not considered
the situation in which an evaluator compares two others and differentially
rewards them, although this is a comparison which has been highly developed in
humans and is probably absent from other animals except in the context of mate
choice.
Mental mechanisms have evolved to subserve
the outcome of these various evaluations, and those in particular which
subserve the outcome of unfavourable comparison, such as depression, anxiety,
inferiority, shame and guilt, are of interest to those who are concerned with
psychopathology (Price et al., 1994).
Soccom JP
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have explored how evolution
can be helpful in understanding the ubiquity of social comparison. We have developed the hypothesis that many
forms of social comparison evolved as components of the mechanisms underlying
intrasexual and intersexual selection, parental investment, reciprocal altruism
and the need for membership of a specific social group. The following forms of comparison have
evolutionary roots in humans, if not also in other animals:
Stronger/weaker: this comparison of fighting capacity, or
resource-holding potential (RHP), underlies ritual agonistic behaviour which is
the form of social competition which subserves intrasexual selection in most
vertebrate species.
More/less attractive to the opposite sex: we know that this comparison is made in our
own species, but we do not know how widespread it is in animals, or how much it
contributes to intersexual selection.
More/less favoured by parents: this comparison of relative parental
investment underlies sibling rivalry. It
may also occur outside the family in the comparison of investment from
teachers, employers and other patrons.
More/less attractive to the reference group: this assessment of relative social
attention-holding power (SAHP) is of two sorts, the comparison of own display
of attractiveness with the displays of others, and the comparison of the
response of the group to those displays (relative approbation).
Creditor/debtor: this ledger of favours given and received is
an essential part of reciprocal exchange.
In-group/out-group: this is a different type of comparison, one
of similarity/difference rather than relative success. Apart from its obvious role in group cohesion
and differentiation, it is important for the evaluation of relative
attractiveness, because it defines an in-group of evaluators whose social
attention is desired, and whose judgements of the performer's display have the
power to raise and lower SAHP.
These
are all comparisons of self with one or more others. We have not considered the situation in which
an evaluator compares two others and differentially rewards them, although this
is a comparison which has been highly developed in humans and is probably
absent from other animals except in the context of mate choice.
Mental
mechanisms have evolved to subserve the outcome of these various evaluations,
and those in particular which subserve the outcome of unfavourable comparison,
such as depression, anxiety, inferiority, shame and guilt, are of interest to
those who are concerned with psychopathology (Price et al., 1994).